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THE ABIDING EXCEPTIONALISM OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS DOCTRINE 
Carlos M. Vázquez∗ 
In their article The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, Pro-
fessors Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth argue that “[foreign af-
fairs] exceptionalism . . . is now exceptional,”1 and that this is a good 
thing.  I agree with much of the authors’ normative argument for 
“normalization” of foreign affairs doctrine (as they define the term).  
But the authors overstate the extent to which such normalization has 
already occurred.  There have indeed been some recent Supreme Court 
decisions that seem to lack the exceptional deference to the Executive 
that had characterized judicial decisionmaking in the foreign affairs 
area in previous years.  But foreign affairs doctrine remains resolutely 
exceptionalist in some areas beyond those identified by the authors as 
reflecting the “unfinished business” of normalization.2  When these ad-
ditional manifestations of exceptionalism are added to the ones the au-
thors have identified, the claim that exceptionalism is now exceptional 
seems overstated. 
I also question the authors’ apparent views about what a “normal-
ized” foreign relations doctrine (as they define the term) would look 
like.  The authors define normalization according to the baseline of 
proper constitutional interpretation.3  In other words, a distinct ap-
proach to foreign affairs issues does not count as exceptionalist if such 
distinct treatment is supported by the Constitution, properly con-
strued.  In defending their normalization thesis, however, the authors 
are not always faithful to their definition of the term.  They take insuf-
ficient account of the possibility that some of the doctrines that they 
regard as exceptionalist merely reflect the distinct treatment that the 
Constitution contemplates for certain issues in the foreign relations  
area. 
The authors note that “[s]ome scholars (generally liberals) like[] 
exceptionalism in the context of federalism, for example, but not when 
it [comes] to executive power.  Others (generally conservatives) seem[] 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  I am grateful for comments from 
Harlan Cohen, Ganesh Sitaraman, and Ingrid Wuerth. 
 1 Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1979 (2015). 
 2 Id. at 1949. 
 3 See infra Part I, pp. 307–10.  The authors apparently also exempt from the “exceptionalist” 
label differences that result from nonconstitutional legal analysis that is “generally applicable.”  
See infra Part I, pp. 307–10 (discussing stare decisis). 
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to take the opposite view.”4  But the scholars who have argued that the 
states have a more limited role and the executive branch a more ex-
pansive one in the foreign relations area than in the domestic area 
have based their arguments on the Constitution, not personal predilec-
tion.  To the extent those constitutional arguments are valid, the result-
ing distinct treatment of foreign relations questions would not count as 
exceptionalist, as the authors define the term.  Indeed, under the au-
thors’ definition, a court would be acting in an exceptionalist manner 
if it were to treat such foreign affairs questions in the same way as 
domestic ones.  
Since the authors’ distinction between exceptionalist and normal 
decisionmaking turns on a prior conclusion regarding the proper con-
stitutional interpretation on a particular question, the argument that 
foreign affairs doctrine was once exceptionalist and has been normal-
ized requires the resolution of some highly contested constitutional 
questions.  It is not surprising that an article that covers as much 
ground as this one does does not engage in a deep constitutional analy-
sis of each of the numerous constitutional doctrines it addresses.  I do 
not fault the authors for not delving more deeply into such questions, 
but it is worth observing that the authors’ claims will not convince 
those who do not share the authors’ constitutional interpretations. 
Part I of this Response discusses the authors’ definition of excep-
tionalism and normalization, which the authors describe as “an inde-
pendent contribution” of the article, “regardless of whether one agrees 
with [its] broader normalization thesis.”5  As noted, their definition col-
lapses the question of normalization with the proper interpretation of 
the Constitution.  In defending their claim that foreign relations law 
was once exceptionalist and has become increasingly normalized, how-
ever, the authors seem to assume that recognizing a lesser role for the 
states in the foreign relations area, or greater discretion in the Execu-
tive, is generally exceptionalist.  What is missing is a demonstration 
that the Constitution, properly construed, assigns the states the same 
role, and gives the Executive no broader role, with respect to foreign 
affairs than with respect to domestic affairs. 
Part II challenges the authors’ characterization of some doctrines 
or decisions as exceptionalist.  The authors cite Missouri v. Holland6 
as an example of foreign relations exceptionalism.7  But the holding of 
Missouri v. Holland is supported by the constitutional text and is con-
sistent with original intent and the case law preceding the decision.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1920. 
 5 Id. at 1902. 
 6 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 7 See infra Part II, pp. 311–15. 
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Likewise, the holding in United States v. Belmont8 is strongly support-
ed by the constitutional text.  Although some of the Court’s reasoning 
in the case was admittedly exceptionalist, the Court offered a more 
normalized rationale for the outcome a few years later in United States 
v. Pink.9  Finally, the authors cite the Court’s recent decisions invigor-
ating the presumption against extraterritoriality as evidence of normal-
ization because the Court rejected the Executive’s proffered interpreta-
tions of the relevant statutes.10  But the presumption applied in these 
cases is itself exceptionalist in ways not recognized by the authors. 
In some respects, the Constitution does fairly clearly provide for 
equivalent treatment of foreign and domestic affairs.  Part III focuses 
on one such area: the judicial enforcement of treaties.  As I have writ-
ten at some length in these pages, the Supremacy Clause establishes 
that treaties are to be enforceable in the courts in the same circum-
stances as statutes.11  Yet the courts have engrafted onto the Suprema-
cy Clause a distinction between self-executing treaties and non-self-
executing treaties, with only the latter being judicially enforceable.12  
Normalization of this doctrine would entail a narrow interpretation of 
the category of non-self-executing treaties.  I have argued that the Su-
preme Court’s decisions on this doctrine are consistent with a narrow, 
normalized approach,13 but the lower courts have adopted a broad un-
derstanding of the doctrine, and the Court’s most recent decision, 
Medellín v. Texas,14 has been interpreted by many, including the au-
thors, as endorsing a broad definition of non-self-executing treaties.15  
If that interpretation is accepted, it would constitute a very significant 
example of exceptionalism in foreign relations doctrine, adding signifi-
cantly to the authors’ catalog of unfinished business. 
I.  NORMALIZATION DEFINED 
As the authors define it, exceptionalism is “the belief that legal is-
sues arising from foreign relations are functionally, doctrinally, and 
even methodologically distinct from those arising in domestic policy.”16  
But not all differences between the doctrines applied in the foreign 
and domestic contexts count as exceptionalist.  “Excluded from [the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
 9 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
 10 E.g., Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1932. 
 11 See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause 
and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008). 
 12 See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008). 
 13 See Vázquez, supra note 11, at 649. 
 14 552 U.S. 491. 
 15 See infra note 90 and accompanying text.  
 16 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1900. 
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authors’] definition [of exceptionalism] are distinctions between foreign 
and domestic powers that result from generally applicable formalist 
analysis based on, for example, constitutional text and original histo-
ry.”17  As an example, the authors point to the distinct procedures set 
forth in the Constitution for concluding treaties as opposed to enacting 
statutes.18  “If generally applicable analysis of text and original history 
allocates foreign affairs powers in particular ways, that allocation is 
still at the baseline”19 and is thus not an example of exceptionalism.  
This is not the only available definition of exceptionalism, or the 
most intuitive.  The authors could have distinguished between proper 
and improper exceptionalism.  On this view, distinct approaches would 
always count as exceptionalist, but some exceptionalism would be 
proper because it would be justified through valid constitutional anal-
ysis, based, for example, on text and original history.  The authors de-
fine exceptionalism more narrowly because, in their view, “[t]he pur-
pose of the term is not just to state that foreign and domestic affairs 
are legally distinct in particular ways, but also to evaluate whether 
those differences are appropriate.”20  In other words, exceptionalism is 
by definition inappropriate.  
The authors appear to recognize only “formalist” constitutional ar-
gument as a proper — and hence not exceptionalist — basis for em-
ploying distinct approaches to resolving legal issues in the foreign and 
domestic spheres.  Presumably this is not because functionalist consti-
tutional argument is unknown in the domestic context, but because the 
authors reject functionalist arguments for distinctions between the for-
eign and domestic spheres on normative grounds (for the reasons set 
forth in Part III of the article).  Even if one agrees with the authors’ 
normative arguments for normalization, however, determining where 
the line falls between proper constitutional bases for distinct ap-
proaches and improper exceptionalism is not straightforward.  Clearly, 
the authors would reject as improper exceptionalism distinct treatment 
based on the judge’s belief that distinct treatment is desirable for func-
tionalist reasons.  Just as clearly, the authors would accept as proper 
non-exceptionalism distinct treatment required by the constitutional 
text, even if the text reflects the Founders’ adherence to functionalist 
arguments of the sort the authors reject.  For example, the authors re-
ject the claim that greater limitations on state power are justified in 
the foreign context on the ground that “individual states can external-
ize the costs of violating international law, because retaliation for the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 Id. at 1908. 
 18 Id.   
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
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offense would be visited on the nation as a whole.”21  Yet the Founders 
relied on just this rationale in adopting certain constitutional provi-
sions.  Thus, Hamilton explained Article III’s grant of federal jurisdic-
tion over certain foreign relations matters on the ground that “the 
Peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a 
PART.”22 
Because the authors also consider constitutional argument based on 
“original history” to be a proper basis for concluding that different 
treatment is proper and thus not exceptionalist, presumably they 
would accept differences based on original intent but not memorialized 
in the constitutional text.  If so, there would appear to be a plausible 
constitutional justification for some of the doctrines that the authors 
regard as exceptionalist, such as those based on the structural prob-
lems that Hamilton identified with leaving foreign relations matters in 
the hands of the states.  A textualist would object to judicial recogni-
tion of doctrines not grounded in text even if supported by the Found-
ers’ broad concerns about leaving foreign relations matters to the 
states.23  But nontextual constitutional interpretation is hardly excep-
tional in the domestic context.  The Court has recognized constitution-
al rights based on “penumbras, formed by emanations” from the con-
stitutional text.24  If such emanations are accepted in domestic de-
cisionmaking, it seems difficult to dismiss as exceptionalist doctrines 
based on emanations from the Constitution’s allocation of numerous 
foreign relations powers to the federal government.  From this per-
spective, the dormant foreign relations doctrine (criticized by the au-
thors as exceptionalist25) seems no more exceptionalist than the 
dormant commerce clause doctrine.  This is not to say that textual and 
nontextual approaches are necessarily equally legitimate.  A Justice or 
scholar can argue that both dormant doctrines are illegitimate.  The 
point, rather, is that determining whether any particular doctrine is ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 Id. at 1942 (citing Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Cri-
tique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1517 (2011)). 
 22 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
 23 Notably, however, some textualists read very general constitutional texts, such as the Execu-
tive Power Vesting Clause, as allocating very extensive powers to the President with respect to 
foreign relations matters.  See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 5–6 (2007).  
 24 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).  The authors seem to recognize the prev-
alence of nontextual constitutional decisionmaking when they implicitly criticize as exceptionalist 
the Supreme Court’s refusal in Missouri v. Holland to recognize limits on the Treaty Power based 
on an “invisible radiation” from the Tenth Amendment, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).  See Sitaraman 
& Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1916 (noting that Missouri v. Holland’s reasoning was based on a 
sharp distinction between domestic and foreign affairs). 
 25 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1920–21.  
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ceptionalist, as the authors define the term, requires resolution of long-
running debates about the proper way to interpret the Constitution. 
The authors’ acceptance of stare decisis as a proper (and thus not 
exceptionalist) ground of decisionmaking — “so long as it is applied 
the same way in domestic and foreign affairs cases”26 — adds further 
complications.  Stare decisis would justify adhering to otherwise 
exceptionalist doctrines and thus problematizes the authors’ call for 
normalization.  Indeed, I have argued that the dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine of Zschernig v. Miller27 (criticized by the authors as excep-
tionalist28) is entitled to the strong version of stare decisis applied to 
statutes as opposed to the weaker version applied to constitutional de-
cisions.29  This argument is based on generally applicable stare decisis 
principles, specifically, the fact that dormant foreign relations deci-
sions, like dormant commerce clause decisions and decisions interpret-
ing statutes, are revisable by Congress.30  To the extent the dormant 
foreign relations doctrine is justified by generally applicable stare 
decisis principles, it would appear to be non-exceptionalist as the au-
thors define the term.  Additionally, it is possible that adherence to ex-
ceptionalist decisions on stare decisis grounds would justify additional 
exceptionalist decisions in related areas not just for reasons of doctri-
nal coherence, but also because a non-exceptionalist decision, when 
combined with the exceptionalist decision retained for stare decisis 
reasons, would leave us further from the constitutionally correct out-
come than would an exceptionalist decision.31  If so, then the (other-
wise) exceptionalist decision would qualify as non-exceptionalist as the 
authors define the term. 
In sum, the authors’ definition of exceptionalism exempts from that 
label any distinction justified by valid constitutional and even 
nonconstitutional arguments.  A judge’s reliance on her own belief that 
foreign relations cases are different would count as exceptionalist, but 
her reliance on the Founders’ adherence to such beliefs would not nec-
essarily.  Adherence to exceptionalist decisions would not be excep-
tionalist if supported by generally applicable principles of stare decisis.  
Indeed, reversal of exceptionalist decisions would count as excep-
tionalist if based on departures from generally applicable stare decisis 
principles. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 Id. at 1908 n.32.  
 27 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 28 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1927. 
 29 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1272 (2001). 
 30 See id. at 1271–72. 
 31 For an example, see my discussion of Medellín’s second holding in Part III, infra. 
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II.  QUESTIONABLE CHARACTERIZATIONS 
In light of the authors’ acceptance of distinctions between foreign 
and domestic doctrines grounded in valid constitutional analysis (at 
least if “formalist”), some of their characterizations of doctrines as 
exceptionalist would appear not to deserve that label.  Moreover, some 
of the developments that the authors claim as support for their nor-
malization thesis would appear to be exceptionalist in respects the au-
thors do not seem to recognize. 
In their narrative of the rise of exceptionalism, the authors devote a 
paragraph to Court’s holding in Missouri v. Holland.32  Although the 
authors hedge in their characterization of the decision as excep-
tionalist,33 they conclude their discussion of the case with the claim 
that this “famously opaque” decision “seemed to rest [partly on] ex-
ceptionalist grounds.”34  In my view, the Court’s holding and analysis 
were well grounded in text and original history and hence not 
exceptionalist. 
As described by the authors, the Court in Missouri v. Holland held 
that “the federal government has broader power acting pursuant to the 
Treaty Power than it does pursuant to the Commerce Clause,” and, 
“arguably,” “that Tenth Amendment limitations do not apply to the 
Treaty Power.”35  But the conclusion that the limitations of the Com-
merce Clause do not apply to the Treaty Power is amply supported by 
the constitutional text, which in Article II confers the Treaty Power on 
the President (“with the Advice and Consent of the Senate”),36 without 
linking it in any way to the Commerce Power conferred on Congress 
in Article I.37  Even if the Treaty Power had been placed in Article I, 
there would be no greater reason to conclude that the limits of the 
Commerce Power apply to it than to conclude that the limits of the 
power to raise and support armies or to create a post office apply to 
the Commerce Power.  It is, indeed, the claim that the limits of the 
Commerce Power apply to the Treaty Power that conflicts with the 
constitutional text.  As for the Tenth Amendment, the Court merely 
noted, uncontroversially, that its reservation to the states of the powers 
not delegated to the federal government was beside the point, since Ar-
ticle II delegates the Treaty Power to the federal government.38  The 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1916–17. 
 33 See id. at 1916 (stating that Missouri v. Holland “arguably contributed to the rise of foreign 
relations exceptionalism”); id. at 1928 n.173 (stating that Missouri v. Holland was “arguably an 
exceptionalist opinion”). 
 34 Id. at 1917. 
 35 Id. at 1916.  
 36 See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 37 See id. 
 38 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). 
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Court’s refusal to find that the treaty was “forbidden by some invisible 
radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment”39 might be 
regarded as exceptional if the Court had found such radiations in the 
domestic context, but the Court’s Lochner-era decisions were based on 
a narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause rather than on ema-
nations from the Tenth Amendment.40  The authors claim that the 
Court’s reasoning “was premised on a sharp distinction between do-
mestic and foreign affairs,”41 and cite as exceptionalist the Court’s 
statement that the limits of the Treaty Power “must be ascertained in a 
different way.”42  But the different texts require different approaches 
to ascertaining the limits of the two clauses.  And, of course, determin-
ing the scope of the Treaty Power requires consideration of the pur-
pose and nature of a treaty as an instrument of international rela-
tions.43  The Court’s holding and analysis in Missouri v. Holland was 
no more exceptionalist than the authors’ acceptance of the different 
methods of concluding treaties and statutes.44 
Also defensible on the basis of constitutional text is the decision  
in United States v. Belmont,45 which also plays a prominent role in  
the authors’ narrative of the rise of exceptionalism.46  The Court in 
Belmont upheld and gave preemptive effect to the Litvinov Assign-
ment, a sole executive agreement.47  Justice Sutherland’s rationale for 
upholding the Assignment was indeed very broad, relying on his 
Curtiss-Wright theory that all state lines disappear with respect to ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 Id. at 434. 
 40 See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  Even if the domestic cases had 
rested on “radiations” from the Tenth Amendment, the fact that these radiations came sub-
sequently to be rejected as mistaken would arguably justify at least a retroactive acceptance of 
Holland as proper non-exceptionalism.  More generally, to the extent a current domestic doctrine 
is misguided, it might well be preferable to find the doctrine inapplicable in the foreign relations 
context than to extend the misguided doctrine to foreign relations cases.  With respect to modern 
Tenth and Eleventh Amendment doctrines, I have expressed the view that it would be better to 
apply the misguided doctrines and seek their reversal in both contexts.  See Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317 (1999); Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 713 (2002).  But I see the ap-
peal of the contrary view. 
 41 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1916. 
 42 Id. at 1917 n.81 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 43 This is presumably the part of the opinion that the authors believe relied upon a “sharp dis-
tinction” between foreign and domestic affairs. 
 44 The authors write that “[t]he historical foundations of Missouri v. Holland are contested.”  
Id. at 1916 n.80.  My own research has led me to agree with the scholars cited by the authors as 
supporting the decision’s consistency with prior history.  See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Missouri v. 
Holland’s Second Holding, 73 MO. L. REV. 939 (2008).  
 45 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
 46 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1915–16. 
 47 Belmont, 301 U.S. at 332. 
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ternal affairs.48  But shortly thereafter the Court offered a narrower 
justification for upholding the Assignment in United States v. Pink.49  
Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court in that case stressed the fact 
that the Assignment was part of a broader package that resulted in the 
United States’ recognition of the Soviet Union.50  The Executive’s ex-
clusive power to recognize foreign nations and their governments has 
textual support in Article II’s allocation to the President of the power 
to send and receive ambassadors.51  The Court in Pink tied the validi-
ty of the sole executive agreement in that case to its connection with 
recognition.52  The settlement of claims of American citizens against 
the Soviet Union was an obstacle to recognition of the Soviet Union, 
and the assignment to the United States of Russian claims against 
Americans was part of a package to compensate U.S. citizens and thus 
remove this obstacle.  “Power to remove such obstacles to full recogni-
tion as settlement of claims of our nationals,” the Court wrote, “cer-
tainly is a modest implied power of the President.”53  Later extensions 
in Dames & Moore54 and Garamendi55 certainly took executive power 
further, but the holdings of Belmont and Pink, if not all of the lan-
guage in the opinions, were well founded in generally applicable con-
stitutional doctrine. 
The authors’ definition of exceptionalism also gives rise to the pos-
sibility that the very same doctrinal development might be an example 
of normalization along one dimension but an example of exceptional-
ization along another.  Some of the Roberts Court decisions that the 
authors cite in support of their normalization thesis appear to be ex-
ceptionalist along dimensions not discussed by the authors.  The au-
thors identify three main categories of exceptionalist doctrine: “non-
justiciability, which suggests expansive deference to the political 
branches; federalism, which rejects state and local participation in for-
eign relations; and executive dominance, which allocates power within 
the federal political branches to the executive.”56  Their examples of 
normalization fall overwhelmingly in the third category.  Many involve 
the Court’s rejection of interpretations of treaties or statutes proffered 
by the executive branch.  Among the latter, the authors cite Morrison57 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 48 Id. at 331 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936)). 
 49 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
 50 See id. at 211–13. 
 51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 52 E.g., 315 U.S. at 227. 
 53 Id. at 229. 
 54 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).  
 55 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 56 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1902. 
 57 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).  
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and Kiobel,58 which held that the presumption against extraterritoriali-
ty applies to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act59 and to the 
federal common law cause of action recognized in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain,60 respectively.61 
While these decisions may reflect normalization insofar as they re-
jected the interpretations of the statutes proposed by the executive 
branch, the Court’s invigoration of the presumption against extraterri-
toriality in these cases is exceptionalist from the nonjusticiability per-
spective, as it removes discretion from the courts in order to safeguard 
the nation’s foreign relations interests.  As the Court has explained, 
this presumption guards against unintended clashes with the laws  
of other nations.62  But this purpose could have been served by other 
approaches to statutory interpretation.  For example, with respect to 
the antitrust laws, the lower courts had developed and applied a juris-
dictional rule of reason, which sought to ascertain the likelihood of 
clashes with the laws of other states on a case-by-case basis.63  Justice 
Scalia favored this approach in his dissent in the Hartford Fire case.64  
With respect to Alien Tort Statute cases, Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
in Kiobel similarly favored a more fine-grained analysis of federal in-
terests in the international sphere.65  The Court’s rejection of this ap-
proach in favor of a strong presumption against extraterritoriality is 
apparently based on its view that the assessment of the foreign rela-
tions consequences of applying federal law extraterritorially is not a 
suitable task for the judiciary.  The Court instead adopted an ap-
proach that overprotects the interest in avoiding offense to foreign 
sovereigns.  The Court sought to achieve this goal, moreover, by dis-
abling the courts from employing ordinary means of statutory interpre-
tation, such as by, apparently, precluding resort to legislative history.66  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 58 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).  
 59 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.  
 60 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 61 The authors describe Kiobel as applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to the 
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1932.  That 
the Court in fact applied the presumption to the federal common law cause of action recognized 
in Sosa, rather than to the Alien Tort Statute qua jurisdictional statute, is explained in Carlos M. 
Vázquez, Things We Do with Presumptions: Reflections on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1719, 1730 (2014). 
 62 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
 63 See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 549 F.2d 597, 
613–15 (9th Cir. 1976), superseded by statute, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 
Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, § 402, 96 Stat. 1233, 1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012)). 
 64 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 65 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 66 Thus, in EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991), which the Court in 
Morrison relied upon, see e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010), 
Justice Marshall noted that the House Report made it clear that the statute was intended to apply 
to discrimination by U.S. employers against U.S. employees employed abroad.  Aramco, 499 U.S. 
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The Court’s adoption of a method of statutory interpretation that 
overprotects the federal interest in avoiding international friction and 
precludes resort to ordinary means of ascertaining statutory meaning, 
grounded on its distrust of the courts’ ability to assess the likelihood of 
such friction in individual cases, is decidedly exceptionalist with re-
spect to justiciability. 
The authors appear to recognize that Morrison and Kiobel dimin-
ish the authority of the courts, but they claim that “[t]he result has 
been to further shift power toward Congress at the expense of the ex-
ecutive.”67  In fact, the presumption against extraterritoriality dimin-
ishes Congress’s role by requiring courts to disregard probative evi-
dence of its intent, imposing a requirement of clarity beyond what is 
necessary for statutes not touching on foreign affairs.  Nor does the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, when compared to other avail-
able approaches, necessarily diminish the role of the Executive.  Con-
trary to the authors’ claim that “a case-by-case approach . . . would af-
ford more control to the executive branch,”68 a case-by-case approach 
need not incorporate deference to the Executive.  The presumption 
against extraterritoriality seems based more on distrust of the courts 
than a desire to limit the role of the Executive.69 
III.  MEDELLÍN’S EXCEPTIONALISM 
There are, to be sure, a number of respects in which the Constitu-
tion contemplates that foreign and domestic affairs will be treated sim-
ilarly.  I agree with the authors’ contention that the Court’s broad  
application of nonjusticiability doctrines and the exceptionally broad 
deference it has often given to the Executive’s views in certain foreign 
relations cases qualify as exceptionalist.  Normalization of some of  
these doctrines is desirable for the reasons given by the authors.  But I 
am not as sure as the authors that the cases they discuss reflect the 
Court’s commitment to normalizing foreign relations law.  The data 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
at 268 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion ignored this evidence 
of legislative intent in construing the statute’s alien exemption.  Morrison may represent a retreat 
from Aramco insofar as the Court recognized that the presumption against extraterritoriality is 
not a clear statement rule and acknowledged that “context” may be consulted.  Morrison, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2883.  But the Court recognized the relevance of context only to “give the most faithful 
reading” of the text, and it again declined to consider legislative history.  Id. (quoting id. at 2892 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. id. at 2892  
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[E]vidence [of legislative intent] legitimately encom-
passes more than the enacted text.”).  
 67 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1933. 
 68 Id. at 1932.   
 69 Cf. Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts 
Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380 (2015) (arguing that the Roberts Court’s foreign relations de-
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points are relatively few, and they may reflect ad hoc coalitions around 
particular results in the relevant cases.  Moreover, there are counterex-
amples that the authors do not consider.  Most significantly, the au-
thors do not discuss what I regard as perhaps the most important doc-
trine in need of normalization — the doctrine of non-self-executing 
treaties.  The recent decision in Medellín v. Texas,70 as the authors in-
terpret it, reflects a giant step in the direction of exceptionalism.71  
When added to the cases identified by the authors as reflecting the un-
finished business of normalization, Medellín suggests that the Court 
may be rejecting exceptionalism only selectively and opportunistically.  
The Court’s failure to review numerous exceptionalist lower court de-
cisions lends support to this alternative thesis.72 
The Supremacy Clause provides a clear textual indication of the 
Founders’ intent to “normalize” treaty enforcement doctrine.  Before 
the Constitution was adopted, the United States adhered to the British 
rule, under which treaties were not judicially enforceable until incor-
porated into domestic law by statute.73  The Supremacy Clause reflects 
the Founders’ intent to reject the British rule and dispense with the 
need for treaties to be implemented by statute.  The clause declares 
“all Treaties” to be the “supreme Law of the Land,”74 along with feder-
al statutes and the Constitution itself, and instructs judges to give ef-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 70 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 71 The authors acknowledge in a footnote that I have argued that a broad understanding of 
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Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999).  
 72 See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The Exceptionalism of Foreign Relations Normalization, 
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 322 (2015) (“[T]here are dozens of other examples of foreign relations 
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preme Court.” Id. at 322 (emphasis omitted).).  
 73 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Response, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 
2158–59 (1999); see also Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 
89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 698–99 (1995) [hereinafter Vázquez, Four Doctrines].  
 74 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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fect to all three forms of federal law.75  This text strongly supports the 
conclusion that treaties should be enforceable in domestic courts in the 
same circumstances as federal statutes and constitutional provisions 
are.76  Yet, in Foster v. Neilson,77 the Court in 1829 ruled that some 
treaties require implementing legislation — a category that has since 
become known as non-self-executing treaties.78  The doctrine of non-
self-executing treaties has been accurately described as among “the 
most confounding in treaty law.”79 
The Court subsequently reversed its holding that the treaty in-
volved in Foster was non-self-executing,80 and it largely ignored the 
doctrine for most of the following two centuries, applying treaties as 
law in numerous cases without pausing to consider whether they were 
self-executing.81  In the latter half of the twentieth century, however, 
the lower courts began applying the doctrine vigorously in what can 
only be described as an exceptionalist manner.  Indeed, it was fre-
quently said during this period that non-self-executing treaties lacked 
the force of domestic law.82  Some courts held that treaties were self-
executing, and hence judicially enforceable, only if they disclosed an 
intent that they should have the force of domestic law.83  The incom-
patibility of these statements with the clear text of the Constitution, 
which declares that “all Treaties” have the force of domestic law, 
shows the highly exceptionalist nature of this doctrine.  As applied by 
these courts, the doctrine sharply distinguishes the standards for en-
forcing treaties from those applicable to the enforcement of statutes, 
despite the clear constitutional text indicating that both are the “su-
preme Law of the Land” to be enforced by judges.  After all, we do not 
say that federal statutes have the force of domestic law only if they 
disclose an intent that they have such force. 
In prior work, I have attempted to reconcile the doctrine of non-
self-executing treaties with the Supremacy Clause’s text.84  I have 
identified four types of reasons why a treaty might not be judicially 
enforceable even though it is the supreme law of the land.  The four 
types of reasons correspond to reasons why analogous federal statutes 
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 75 See id. 
 76 See Paul B. Stephan, Private Remedies for Treaty Violations After Sanchez-Llamas, 11 
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 78 See id. at 314. 
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 81 See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 73, at 716 & n.99. 
 82 See id. at 703 & n.37. 
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would not be judicially enforceable.  In other words, I have argued for 
a normalization of the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties.  In par-
ticular, I have argued that, to the extent the self-execution issue turns 
on intent, the court should conclude that the treaty is judicially en-
forceable unless it states clearly that its provisions are subject to legis-
lative implementation. 
The Court in Medellín recently had an opportunity to normalize 
the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties, but it is fair to say that it 
did not do so.  The issue was whether the Texas courts were required 
to comply with a judgment of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ).85  Despite a treaty provision stating that the parties “undertake[] 
to comply” with the judgments of the ICJ,86 the Court found no  
domestic-law obligation to comply with the judgments of the ICJ.87  
Much of the Court’s analysis was distinctly exceptionalist.  The clear 
text of the Supremacy Clause would appear to require the conclusion 
that our undertaking to comply with the ICJ’s judgments has the force 
of domestic law.  But the Court completely ignored the constitutional 
text — a notably exceptionalist approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion that contrasts sharply with the Court’s approach to deciding con-
stitutional issues that very Term in cases such as District of Columbia 
v. Heller.88  In clarifying what it meant by a non-self-executing treaty, 
the Court wrote: 
What we mean by “self-executing” is that the treaty has automatic domes-
tic effect as federal law upon ratification.  Conversely, a “non-self-
executing” treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable 
federal law.  Whether such a treaty has domestic effect depends upon im-
plementing legislation passed by Congress.89 
Since the Supremacy Clause itself gives “all Treaties” automatic effect 
as federal law upon ratification, the Court’s very definition of the con-
cept of non-self-execution was strikingly exceptionalist.  In finding the 
treaty to be non-self-executing, the Court cited with approval some of 
the exceptionalist lower court decisions mentioned above,90 leading 
some courts and commentators to conclude that the Court had estab-
lished a strong presumption against self-execution, rebuttable only by 
clear evidence that the treaty was intended to have the force of domes-
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 85 See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008). 
 86 Id. at 508. 
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 88 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 89 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505 n.2. 
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tic law.91  As already noted, in enforcing statutes, we do not ask 
whether Congress intended that the statute have the force of domestic 
law. 
The proper interpretation of Medellín is uncertain, as the Court 
gave a number of reasons, not all consistent with each other, for find-
ing the treaty involved in that case to be non-self-executing.92  Most 
scholars agree that much of the Court’s exceptionalist analysis cannot 
be taken seriously.93  I have argued that some of the Court’s analysis is 
consistent with a narrow, normalized version of the doctrine of non-
self-execution.  Specifically, I have argued that the Court understood 
the term “undertakes” to mean something other than “shall” or “must” 
comply, and thus concluded that the treaty did not in fact impose an 
absolute obligation to comply with ICJ judgments.94  The Court ap-
peared to understand the treaty to impose instead an obligation to use 
best efforts to comply.  If so, the Court’s interpretation of the treaty 
was erroneous, but its conclusion that such a treaty was non-self-
executing was not.95 
Whether a normalized interpretation of Medellín will be widely 
adopted remains to be seen.  But I note that the authors do not em-
brace it, as they describe Medellín as finding the treaty to be non-self-
executing even though the Court viewed “the ICJ judgment [as] bind-
ing on the United States as a matter of international law.”96  If the au-
thors are right, then Medellín’s approach to non-self-executing treaties 
stands as a huge counterexample to their thesis that the trend during 
the Roberts Court has been towards normalization of foreign relations 
doctrine.  Indeed, unless normalized as I suggest, Medellín’s approach 
to the judicial enforcement of one of the three categories of federal law 
identified in the Supremacy Clause would appear to be an enormous 
step by the Roberts Court in the direction of exceptionalism. 
The authors cite Medellín as exemplifying normalization of foreign 
relations law in two respects.  First, they argue that the Court’s rejec-
tion of the dissent’s “arrestingly indeterminate” approach to the self-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 91 See, e.g., Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 202 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that Medellín 
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execution enhanced the power of Congress while diminishing that of 
the Executive.97  But it is unclear why enhancing the power of Con-
gress counts as normalization (particularly when the constitutional text 
was intended to dispense with the need for legislative implementation).  
Moreover, as discussed above, an indeterminate approach need not in-
corporate deference to the Executive.  Indeed, the Court’s unwilling-
ness to trust the courts with a case-by-case assessment appears to be in 
tension with the authors’ recognition that nonjusticiability doctrines 
count as exceptionalist.  In any event, the Court could have normalized 
self-execution doctrine along the dimensions the authors discuss by 
adopting a “bright-line” presumption that treaties are self-executing.  
Such a holding would have had the additional benefit of being in ac-
cord with a generally applicable formalist approach to constitutional 
interpretation. 
The authors also count as an example of normalization the Court’s 
refusal in Medellín to give effect to the President’s memorandum in-
structing the state courts to comply with the ICJ’s judgment.98  While 
this holding does diminish the role of the Executive, I would argue 
that upholding the President’s power to order compliance would have 
been the less exceptionalist holding.  After all, there was a treaty in 
force by which the United States undertook to comply with the judg-
ments of the ICJ.  The only reason the Court had to reach the question 
of the validity of the President’s memorandum was because of its high-
ly exceptionalist decision finding that treaty to be non-self-executing.99  
In light of its exceptionalist approach to self-execution, the Court’s ac-
ceptance of a presidential power to require compliance with a non-self-
executing treaty would have resulted in a less exceptionalist outcome 
overall than rejection of such a power.  The normalized outcome 
would have been direct enforcement of the treaty provision requiring 
compliance with the ICJ judgment.  The Court’s exceptionalist ruling 
on non-self-execution combined with an acceptance of a presidential 
power to require compliance would have come closer to that normal-
ized outcome than its exceptionalist ruling on non-self-execution com-
bined with its rejection of such a presidential power.  Under the first 
alternative, compliance turns on the President’s consent, which is clos-
er to the normalized outcome than the second alternative, which re-
quires the consent of the President plus a majority of both Houses of 
Congress.  To be sure, adjusting the powers of one branch to compen-
sate for a shift in doctrine in a related area is not a conventional or 
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widely used approach to constitutional interpretation, but it is a defen-
sible generally applicable approach.100 
Even if the part of Medellín rejecting the President’s memorandum 
were considered separately from the Court’s exceptionalist non-self-
execution holding, I doubt that it reflects a move by the Roberts Court 
towards normalization of foreign relations doctrine.  As the authors 
note, the Court relied primarily on the notion that the existence of a 
non-self-executing treaty placed the case in the third Youngstown cate-
gory,101 meaning that the President would have had greater power to 
require compliance if there had been no treaty undertaking to comply 
with ICJ judgments.102  This reasoning is not just “weak,” as the au-
thors acknowledge,103 but absurd.104  Still, it is what the Court said.105  
To the extent the Court relied on this reasoning, Medellín does not tell 
us anything about the President’s power to require compliance with 
ICJ judgments, or take other action on his own authority, in the ab-
sence of a non-self-executing treaty. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Professors Sitaraman and Wuerth make a strong case that normali-
zation of foreign relations law would be desirable in many contexts 
and that the Court has made some moves in this direction.  However, 
their characterization of certain foreign relations doctrines as excep-
tionalist is subject to question under their own definition of excep-
tionalism.  Moreover, they have overlooked an important doctrine in 
dire need of normalization that the Roberts Court has taken in an 
exceptionalist direction.  Adding the Court’s exceptional treatment of 
this doctrine to the list of other doctrines that the authors acknowledge 
remain to be normalized calls into question the authors’ conclusion 
that exceptionalism has become exceptional. 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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